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INTRODUCTION:
THE STORY OF HEWLETT-PACKARD
Barbara Black*
A bedrock principle of corporate governance is that the board of
directors acts as a collective body to promote better decision-making. A
frequently-cited treatise states the principle thusly: "[t]he board of
directors is a collegial body that, for the most part, is expected to make
decisions by consensus."1 As an illustration of the importance of this
principle, courts defer to board actions, even those involving a
considerable outlay of cash, that are undertaken "to resolv[e] an internal
rift in management of serious proportions and at the highest executive
level."2
Collegial, informed decision-making requires that directors can trust
that their fellow directors will maintain the confidentiality of their
deliberations. Moreover, serious adverse legal ramifications can result
from unauthorized disclosures of corporate information. 3 Accordingly, a
director owes the corporation a duty of confidentiality which is an aspect
of the director's more general duty to act in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation.
4
Nevertheless, headlines frequently provide examples of corporate
boards that do not live up to the model of collegiality. Hewlett-Packard
Co. (HP) is a recent, well-publicized example of a dysfunctional board.
For many years HP was a well-respected corporation known for its
"William Hewlett/Dave Packard Way." Bitter divisions developed on
the board of directors, however, under the leadership of Carly Fiorina,
HP's first outside CEO. Fiorina was hired in 1999 as an agent of change
to revive the company. Her centralization of power and cost-cutting
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. I want to thank all the participants in the March 14, 2008 Symposium on
Dysfunctional Boards, especially Gary P. Kreider, Esq., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, LLP; Clifford
A. Roe, Jr., Esq., Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP; and John S. Stith, Esq., Porter Wright & Morris LLP, who
provided valuable insights in their roles as moderators of the sessions.
1. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 5.4B.1, at 76 (2d ed., 2009).
2. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988) (according business judgment rule
presumption to GM board's purchase of its stock owned by Ross Perot). Similarly, courts do not view
"group think" as a serious danger. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-51 (Del. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiff's "structural bias" argument).
3. AMERICAN BAR ASsoCIATION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S HANDBOOK 78-79 (4th ed., 2004)
(discussing impact of Regulation FD on corporate policies regarding the persons who are authorized to
communicate with the public).
4. Id. at 10- 11.
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measures created resentment within the company, as did her image as a
"Rock Star CEO.",5 In 2002 she pushed through a controversial Compaq
merger that Walter Hewlett, a director and son of co-founder William
Hewlett, fiercely opposed. In January 2005, and again in January 2006,
confidential discussions at the annual directors' retreats were leaked to
the press. An investigation after the first leak did not determine the
source. 6 After the second leak, the board of directors put heavy pressure
on Patricia C. Dunn, who was appointed the nonexecutive chair of the
board after Fiorina was fired in February 2005,7 to find the source of the
leaks. As she testified to a Congressional subcommittee, "the majority of
directors told me during my first few weeks as Chairman that, next to
leading the Board's CEO search, coming to grips with HP's famously
leaky Board should be my top priority." 8 The investigation that she
authorized did discover, by May 2006, the source of the second leak, Dr.
George A. Keyworth 11, 9 but HP paid a heavy price for this knowledge.
In fall 2006, HP became embroiled in headline-grabbing scandal and
disgrace after another director, Thomas J. Perkins, disclosed to the SEC
and California authorities that the investigators used possibly illegal and
certainly unethical techniques to obtain information about HP directors
and employees as well as journalists. These methods included
"pretexting" to obtain personal telephone records, sending an email to a
journalist that had an attached tracing mechanism, and surveillance of
the individuals.
10
All HP directors and employees are subject to the company's
Standards of Business Conduct that require prior approval before
5. See Pui-Wing Tam, Hewlett-Packard Board Considers a Reorganization, WALL ST. J., Jan.
24,2005.
6. Hewlett-Packard's Pretexting Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 45 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing]
(prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l09_house-hearings&docid=f:
31472.pdf.
7. See Pui-Wing Tam, H-P's Board Ousts Fiorina as CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 110795431536149934.html.
8. Hearing, supra note 6, at 45 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
9. Keyworth had been a director since 1986, the longest serving director. See Hewlett Packard
Co., 2005 Definitive Proxy Statement, at 16-17 (2004). He had served as Science Advisor to the
President and Director of the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy under President
Reagan. Id. at 17.
10. See HEWLETT PACKARD Co., Annual Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Sept. 6, 2006). See also Alan
Murray, H-P Board Clash over Leaks Triggers Angry Resignation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at Al,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB11 5749453036454340.html?mod=homewhatsnewsus. A
chronology of the key events is also available. See Tracking the H-P Controversy, WSJ.cOM, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-hptime0609.html.
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granting interviews or providing comments to the press.'" Moreover,
even if a director sincerely believes that management's policies are
misguided, the solution is not to leak confidential information to the
press; instead, the director should work to change management's
policies or management.12 What confluence of events caused at least one
HP director to breach his obligation to maintain the confidentiality of
corporate information? 13 What, in turn, drove the board chair to think it
was acceptable conduct to spy on her fellow directors? As described by
HP's CEO Mark Hurd, when he was called before Congress to testify
about these events: "What began as a proper and serious inquiry of leaks
to the press of sensitive company information [from within the HP
board] became a rogue investigation that violated [HP's] own principles
and values."'
14
Hewlett-Packard presents a cautionary tale of the damage caused by
distrust and dissension within the boardroom. At the March 14, 2008
symposium, eight scholars tackled the broader issues suggested by the
HP story to explore the causes of dysfunctional boards and attempt to
formulate some possible cures. I am proud to introduce the participants'
Articles, each of which is an important contribution to the scholarship in
this area. In this introduction, I will summarize the papers and
periodically return to the HP story to relate their analysis to its facts.
In starting off the symposium, Professor Gevurtz provides two
important reminders: first, complaints about board performance are
neither new nor limited to U.S. corporations1 5 and, second, the
quintessential question-what is the function of boards?-remains
unanswered. 16 Accordingly, he suggests that perhaps the best solution is
11. HP STANDARDS OF BUSINESS CONDUCT § 8.5 (2006) [hereinafter SBC 2006], available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/71/71087/corpgov/sbcbrochure2006.pdf. See also HP
STANDARDS OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 7-8, 14 (2008), available at http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitiz
enship/csr/sbcbrochure.pdf.
12. SBC 2006, supra note 11, at 22-23.
13. Other corporations have also suffered from leaky boards. In 2007, Dow Chemical announced
that it had fired two senior executives, one of whom was a director, for allegedly engaging in
unauthorized talks to sell the company. See Jeffrey Ball, Dennis K. Berman, & Joann S. Lublin, Officials
Fired at Dow Chemical for Secret Talks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2007, at AI, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB 117638449048167683.html.
14. Hearing, supra note 6, at 728 (testimony of Mark Hurd, President, Chief Executive Officer,
and Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard, Co.). Describing it as a "rogue investigation" may be self-
serving, as Miriam Baer points out. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Coporate Policing and Corporate
Governance: What Can We Learn from Hewlett Packard's Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
523, 531, 535 (2008).
15. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Function of "Dysfunctional" Boards, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 391
(2008).
16. Id. at 398 (reviewing with skepticism the classic explanations: managing, monitoring, and
mediating).
385
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to take a minimalist approach toward the question of the board's
function. Professor Gevurtz goes back to the board's origins in the
English trading companies as a way of providing political legitimacy
through a representative body and argues that, rather than being
dysfunctional, the internal strife among the HP directors might simply
have reflected dissension among the shareholders that had to be worked
through.
Four articles deal with various attributes of directors as they relate to
the optimal composition and appropriate functions of the board. They
present a number of thorny questions, including:
* How can the board identify and deal with common pathologies
of corporate leaders;
* What is the impact of racial, ethnic and gender diversity on the
board;
* What is the appropriate balance between expert and generalist
directors;
* What is the appropriate role for the board-advisor or
supervisor, or some mix of the two.
Professor Barnard identifies five recurring pathologies among
corporate leaders-narcissism, over-optimism, fear, anger and
depression-and considers the impact of these pathologies on the
leader's organization.' 7 While she acknowledges that some of these
pathologies may contribute to a corporate leader's success, unchecked
dysfunction at the top can nevertheless have harmful consequences for
the organization. For example, Professor Barnard suggests that
defensiveness and inflexibility inspired by fear may have caused Fiorina
to undertake the Compaq merger alone-a deal that may have been
beyond her competence to manage.'
8
Professor Barnard sets forth a number of solutions. Specifically, she
proposes that the board of directors, consistent with its oversight
responsibility, should (1) understand how pathologies may influence
CEO behavior, (2) recognize whether the corporation's CEO is behaving
pathologically and assess the negative impact on the organization, and,
most importantly (3) determine an appropriate plan for dealing with the
effects of the pathology. In addition, because directors may have
difficulty in identifying pathologies that they themselves may be prone
to, boards should institute, as a regular agenda item, a "pathology audit"
for senior executives.'
9
17. Jayne W. Bamard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger and Depression: The Interior
Life of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 405 (2008).
18. Id. at 424 & n.115.
19. Id. at 428.
386
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Professors Broome and Krawiec next discuss preliminary findings
from their initial interviews with twenty-four public company board
members, 20 conducted as part of a larger qualitative study on the impact
of board diversity on corporate performance. Their preliminary findings
are consistent with past research showing that corporations have sought
out females and minorities for the purpose of increasing board diversity.
In examining why corporations think diversity on the board is important,
the authors focus on the rationale frequently mentioned in the
interviews: signaling theory. Specifically, corporations may add
diversity to their boards to send a message to relevant audiences. The
message may be targeted to the workforce (equal opportunity in the
workplace), consumers (attention to the needs of women and minorities
in product and service development), or, more abstractly, to the general
public, to demonstrate that the corporation is "progressive" or "forward-
looking." The authors note, however, that signaling can be intentionally
deceptive if the costs of mimicking are low.
2 1
In his review of the empirical literature in financial accounting,
Professor Cunningham focuses on the attributes or skills that directors
should bring to the task. After placing in historical context the
ascendancy of independence as the director's most important attribute,
despite the lack of evidence showing a strong correlation between
independence and improved corporate performance, the author sets forth
the emerging appeal for expertise, particularly accounting expertise as a
result of Enron and other financial accounting scandals, and Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 23 Professor Cunningham notes that the
empirical evidence shows a strong positive correlation between
independence and financial reporting quality when accounting experts
serve on audit committees. This evidence suggests that the law should
encourage, if not require, the appointment of accounting experts to audit
committees and should encourage their active engagement in real
earnings management. The judicial response, however, has been to the
contrary. While courts consistently defer to the judgment, and protect
the business decisions, of incompetent independent directors, they
provide no safe harbor for directors who contribute their expertise to the
decision-making process and, in fact, may penalize them for their
20. Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is
Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 431 (2008).
21. Id. at 449-50.
22. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the
Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465 (2008).
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)(2) (2007)).
387
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expertise. Returning to a theme introduced by Professor Gevurtz,
Professor Cunningham concludes by noting the lack of consensus as to
"what independent directors are supposed to do."24
Professor Frankel observes that one important condition for a well-
functioning board is for the directors to understand and agree upon the
board's objectives and roles.25 Her paper examines two different roles
for the board-advisors to the CEO or supervisors of the CEO-and the
importance of the board's establishing the appropriate balance between
them within the corporation's culture. Frequently, however, these
understandings are assumed and only worked through in times of
corporate crisis. In addition, because of its dependence on management
for information, the board must trust the CEO far more than the CEO
must trust the board. Professor Frankel notes that the strength of the HP
culture, exemplified not by the board but by the employees, allowed the
corporation to survive its crisis.
The HP story suggests that the efforts to diversify the HP board (with
respect to both gender and expertise) contributed to its dysfunctionality.
Patricia Dunn, the nonexecutive Chair, was invited to join the board in
1998 (one year before Carly Fiorina became CEO) as a "fresh face" and
because of her financial and corporate governance expertise.26 At the
time she joined the board, the only other woman on the 14-person board
was a member of the Packard family. 27 Dunn was described as bringing
a "careful, rules-based approach to life.",28 As such, she was a contrast to
wealthy venture capitalist Tom Perkins, another HP director, described
as a "boisterous Silicon Valley legend, in love with fast cars, large
sailboats and getting his own way." 29 Dunn said that she was appointed
non-executive chair in 2005 because she "was one of the few directors
who was still talking to everyone., 30 Since she saw her role as moving
the board from a "founder's board" to a "modern fully professional
board," perhaps it is not surprising that conflicts developed between
24. Cunningham, supra note 22, at 499.
25. Tamar Frankel, Corporate Boards of Directors: Advisors or Supervisors?, 77 U. CIN. L.
REV. 501 (2008).
26. George Anders & Alan Murray, Behind H-P Chairman's Fall, Clash with a Powerful
Director, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at A 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1160361364200
86488.html.
27. Dunn had been CEO at Barclay Global Investors, an international institutional investment
manager. Hewlett-Packard Co., 1999 Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 6 (1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/0001047469-99-000720.txt.




HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 388 2008-2009
2008] INTRODUCTION-DYSFUNCTIONAL BOARDS
Dunn and Perkins and that a "respect gap" existed. 3' According to
another HP director, Perkins's behavior toward Dunn was "chairman
abuse.,
32
Dunn testified that, prior to the identification of Keyworth as the
source of the 2006 leak, Perkins pressured her not to disclose the name
of the leaker to the full board and that Perkins felt betrayed when,
against his wishes, the board was told it was Keyworth.33 Perkins was
also upset that he was not told the identity of the leaker in advance of the
board meeting. Instead, before the board meeting, Dunn shared the
information with the audit committee, which oversees the Standards of
Business Conduct, and not with the nominating and governance
committee, which was headed by Perkins. 34 Dunn believed this was
"very sensitive" because Perkins and Keyworth were close friends and
allies on the board. Although the board requested Keyworth to resign, he
refused to do so. Perkins, however, resigned in protest over the
identification of Keyworth; Perkins's subsequent public disclosure of
the questionable investigative tactics set in motion the public outcry that
led to Dunn's downfall.
The HP board's dysfunctionality may also have stemmed, in part,
from its failure to achieve agreement on the board as to its appropriate
role. Keyworth and Perkins, as longtime HP directors deeply versed in
the technology, appeared to disparage the importance of corporate
governance and financial expertise that Dunn represented, contributing
to a board culture prone to "destructive criticism, personality clashes and
infighting."
35
With the final two papers, the symposium turns to the board's role to
ensure the corporation's compliance with the law. Professor Baer uses
the HP pretexting scandal to explore the largely unexplored conflict
between corporate policing and corporate governance. 6 Building on
both corporate governance and law enforcement scholarship, she sets
forth the tension between corporate governance norms and the board's
responsibility to oversee its internal compliance department, a tension
that is exacerbated in the post-SOX era where government expects
corporations to be its partner in ferreting out corporate crime. Dunn's
description, when she defended the investigative techniques used to
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Hearing, supra note 6, at 64-68 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman
of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
34. Id. See Murray, supra note 10.
35. Frankel, supra note 25, at 513.
36. Baer, supra note 14, at 535-36.
389
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discover the source of the board leak as "old-fashioned detective
work, 37 accurately describes public law enforcement practices that
routinely use deception to obtain information. The use of deception and
spying on corporate directors does not, however, (to state the obvious)
promote the values of loyalty, trust, and transparency that are considered
fundamental to good corporate governance. Nevertheless, in the face of
pressure to determine the source of the leaks, perhaps it should not be so
surprising that Dunn condoned the use of deceptive tactics routinely
used in police investigations. Moreover, as corporate compliance
departments increasingly are viewed as "private attorneys general,"
boards may feel similar pressure in the face of government demands to
cooperate in their investigations. Beyond the pretexting scandal,
Professor Baer observes that there are currently "no universally
enforceable standards for corporate internal investigations and few
mechanisms in place to monitor corporate investigations." 38 For those
who take corporate governance seriously, this raises the disturbing
likelihood that the HP pretexting scandal is not likely to be an isolated
problem. Boards will only become more dysfunctional if directors feel
the need to spy and deceive each other.
Finally, Professor Henning examines how boards respond to threats of
corporate criminal liability.39 In reviewing four recent instances (Enron,
Chiquita, United Healthcare and Staples), he finds that responses by
boards are frequently insufficient to effect a change in the corporate
culture that would prevent future violations. He recommends that, in
dealing with charges of serious wrongdoing, the board should appoint a
special committee of truly independent directors to manage the crisis
and follow the procedures set forth in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado40 in
order to promote a well-considered and thorough response.
With the development of the modem corporation, corporate boards
have been the locus of corporate authority, and particularly since the
1980s, boards and their performance have been under intense scrutiny.
Nevertheless, corporate law has not developed a consistent theory for
what boards are supposed to do; instead, it sends mixed messages about
the functions and expectations of boards and the appropriate people to
sit on them. The HP saga illustrates some of the dilemmas faced by
directors confronted by these competing pressures.
37. Hearing, supra note 6, at 62 (prepared statement of Patricia C. Dunn, Former Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co.).
38. Baer, supra note 14, at 572.
39. Peter J. Henning, Board Dysfunction: Dealing with the Threat of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 585 (2008).
40. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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